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1.  Introduction 
There is substantial evidence that models of purely self-interested Nash behavior usually fail to 
explain individual behavior in situations in which private and social interests diverge, such as 
public good provision or common pool resource extraction.  Several theories have emerged in an 
attempt to explain why individual choices differ from those predicted by self-interested Nash 
behavior. Many of these explanations are based on the assumption that individuals are motivated 
by a combination of both pure self- interest and other motivations such as altruism, reciprocity, 
inequality aversion, or conformism. Although there is a significant theoretical and experimental 
literature on theories explaining non-selfish behavior, to date there has been no study that 
develops a unified theoretical framework to discriminate among these competing models.  
Moreover, much of the literature focuses on models of reciprocity and altruism, but conformism 
has been given little attention. 
This paper develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who 
extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a mix of self-interest and other 
motivations.  In addition to a model of purely self-interested behavior, the other motivations that 
we consider are: 
1. Altruism.  Individuals have utility functions that include a positive weight on the payoffs 
of others.   3
2. Reciprocity that is conditioned on the expected resource extraction of others. In this 
model individuals place a positive weight on the payoffs of others when they expect 
others’ extraction choices to not exceed their own, and a negative weight on the payoffs 
of others when they expect others’ extraction choices to exceed their own. 
3. Inequity  aversion is similar to reciprocity, but individuals condition their choices on how 
their payoffs compare to the payoffs of others. Individuals place a positive value on the 
payoffs of others when they do not exceed their own, but they place a negative value on 
the payoffs of others when they do exceed their own. 
4. Conformism.  Individuals bear an internal penalty when their own choices deviate from 
the average choices of the others. 
Using data from a series of common pool resource experiments conducted in rural Colombia, we 
test whether an econometric summary of subjects’ strategies is consistent with one of these 
motivations.  
Our models of altruism and reciprocity are adapted from the models developed by Levine 
(1998) and Bowles (2003). Our model of reciprocity generates a similar Nash best response 
function to that generated by Falk et al. (2002), who adapted Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) notion 
of inequity aversion to the common pool resource problem. We model conformism in a way that 
is similar to Luzzati (1999) and Bowles (2003), although Bowles calls this motivation ‘guilt’. 
Each of these motivations, when combined with pure self-interest, generates a unique Nash best 
response function. We estimate individual extraction choices as a function of the individuals’ 
expectation about the choices of the other group members. This yields a summary of individual 
best response functions that we then use to determine which motivation best explains average 
choices in our subject pool. 
The common pool resource experiments were framed as an extraction decision from a 
community-owned natural resource. The experiments were conducted in three regions of 
Colombia in communities that are highly dependent on the extraction of a shared natural 
resource. Thus, the participants regularly face a social dilemma in their everyday lives similar to 
that presented in the experiment. Therefore, it is likely that participants’ prior experiences with 
common pool resources and similar social dilemmas may influence their preferences and choices 
in a way that is not controlled by the experiment (Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004).   
During an experiment, groups of five participants played 10 rounds of an open access   4
game.
1  Individuals payoffs were derived from a conventional model of common pool resource 
exploitation.  Each round, subjects were asked to decide how much to extract from a shared 
resource. In addition, participants were also asked to provide their expectation of the aggregate 
level of extraction they anticipated that the others would choose in the current round.  With data 
on both individual choices and the expectations about the aggregate choices of others, we 
estimate best response functions that are conditioned on an individual’s expectation of the 
choices of the other four group members.
2  
As expected, we find that average extraction levels lie between that predicted by a model 
of purely self-interested behavior and that which would maximize group earnings. This result is 
consistent with individual strategies that balance self-interest and other factors.  Our theoretical 
model suggests that the best response functions for individuals motivated by reciprocity or 
inequity aversion are not necessarily monotonic and will have segments that are downward-
sloping. Altruistic preferences yield a monotonically decreasing best response function, and 
conformism suggests that the best response function will be monotonically increasing if 
conformism dominates pure self-interest.  
Because the best response functions may be non-monotonic, we estimate a spline 
regression of individual extraction choices as a function of the expectations of what the others in 
their group will extract. Our estimation results indicate that the best response function is non-
decreasing for relatively low levels of others’ extraction, and is strictly increasing for mid to high 
levels of others’ extraction. This suggests that a model of conformism best characterizes average 
strategies. We emphasize that our results do not suggest that all individuals are solely motivated 
by conformism, and not by altruism, reciprocity, or inequity aversion; only that an empirical 
summary of individual strategies reveals that conformism is dominant.   
Our approach and results differ from similar studies in significant ways. Fischbacher, 
Gachter and Fehr (2001) analyze individuals’ contribution schedules given the average 
contribution level of the other group members in a public good experiment. They graph the 
individual strategies of 44 participants and show that about half of the subjects are ‘conditional 
cooperators’, which they define as individuals who are willing to cooperate the more others 
                                                 
1 Each group played 10 additional rounds with different treatments involving combinations of communication and 
regulatory control. These additional data are not included in the present analysis.  
2 We should note an important caveat at this point. Strictly speaking, the models of Nash strategies that we develop 
apply to static common pool games, while our experiments clearly placed subjects in a dynamic environment. Thus, 
our results should be interpreted with this qualification in mind.   5
cooperate. Kurzban and Houser (2005) use a statistical-type classification algorithm to 
empirically assign individuals to one of three types in a public good experiment.  Their algorithm 
identifies 20% of their subjects as free-riders, 13% as cooperators (altruists) and 63% as 
reciprocators or conditional cooperators.   
Here, we focus on an econometric estimate of individuals’ strategies and the summary it 
provides. Moreover, we have been able to distinguish between reciprocity and conformism as 
possible causes for conditional cooperation as previously identified by Frey and Meir (2004). 
Interestingly, Bardsley (2000) argues for the need to also distinguish between these alternative 
motivations in public goods provisions, which is exactly what we have accomplished in the 
context of a common pool resource experiment. 
Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) survey the experimental evidence of ultimatum, dictator, 
public goods, and gift exchange games (among others) and argue that many experimental results 
can be explained by individual preferences for fairness and reciprocity. Our results suggest 
otherwise.  Moreover, this literature fails to discriminate among other possible models, 
particularly conformism.  In general, economists have been less interested in conformism as a 
motive driving individual behavior, although some have considered conformism in the context of 
public goods games. Luzzati (1999) provides a theoretical model of conformism in these 
situations. Carpenter (2004) provides experimental evidence that conformism could actually 
increase free-riding in public goods games. In contrast, our experiments suggest that conformism 
leads to more conservative exploitation of common resources.  
The evidence explaining individual choices in common pool resource games is quite 
limited. Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis (2000) reported results of common pool resource 
experiments conducted in rural villages of Colombia that are not consistent with the conventional 
Nash equilibrium levels of extraction. However, they did not attempt to attribute individual 
behavior to alternative preferences. Casari and Plott (2003) formulate a model of other regarding 
preferences that includes altruism or spite as alternatives to pure self-interest.  From a pool of 32 
subjects they found that about one third are other regarding, and these are predominantly spiteful.  
Falk,  Fehr, and Fischbacher (2002) developed a theoretical explanation of behavior in common 
pool resource games by using Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequity aversion and the 
empirical regularities reported in Walker, Garden and Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom, Walker and 
Garden (1992). Our results challenge Falk et al’s focus on inequity aversion and Casari and   6
Plott’s focus on spite by suggesting that conformism is a better summary of individual behavior 
in open access problems.  
     Our results have profound implications for the understanding of individual behavior in 
the commons, and for the design and evaluation of government interventions to promote more 
efficient use of common pool resources. We stress the importance of the conformism motive and 
the role that it plays in producing outcomes that are more efficient than conventional Nash 
equilibria. Moreover, our results make it clear that policies based on conventional individual 
self-interests will not be appropriate when conformism is a more important motive.    
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section develops the theoretical 
models of pure Nash strategies under alternative sets of preferences. The third section focuses on 
the experimental design and the fourth section presents our econometric results. The last section 
concludes.  
 
2. Models of Self-Interest, Altruism, Reciprocity (Inequity Aversion), and Conformism 
In this section we present models of pure Nash strategies when individuals are motivated by self-
interest, and self-interest combined with altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion and conformism.  
Each of these alternatives generates best response function with distinct characteristics. Our 
experiment design and econometric estimations allows us to test for these characteristics.   
 
2.1 Self-Interested Nash Strategies 
The benchmark model for our study is the standard problem of individual extraction from a 
common pool resource by n individuals. The model is static and is similar to models presented 
by Ostrom et al. (1994), Falk et al. (2002), and an earlier model developed by Cornes and 
Sandler (1983). 
Individual i extracts xi units up to a capacity constraint 
max
i x . Units of extraction sell at a 
constant price p. The individual’s extraction costs are 
11 ,
nn
ii i ii cx d x x
== + ∑ ∑  where c and d 
are positive constants. Define  , ij ji x x − ≠ =∑  and write i’s extraction costs more compactly as 
() () . ii i ii cx x d x x x −− ++ +  These components of the cost function capture the social dilemma 
of the model in which  ( ) ii i dx x x− +  captures the cost externality that is typical of common pool   7
resource problems, while  ( ) ii cx x − +  captures negative externalities that reduce individual 
existence or non-use values.  The individual has an endowment ei.  
Given the extraction of others, the individual’s self-interested extraction choice is 
determined by maximizing: 
 
[1]  () () , ii i i i i i i ep xc xx d x xx π −− =+ − + − +  subject to  .
max
ii x x ≤  
 
Throughout we will let  i π  denote individual i’s monetary payoff. Since  i π  is strictly concave in 
xi, the following Kuhn-Tucker condition is necessary and sufficient to identify a solution to [1]: 
 
[2]  20 ,  i f   0 ,   .
max
ii i i p c dx dx x x − −− − ≥ > =  
 
Letting [2] hold with equality and solving for xi yields the unconstrained best response function:  
 
[3]  ˆ ()( ) / 2 . i
s
ii x xp c d x d − − =− −   
 
The superscript s denotes the strategy of a purely self-interested individual. Incorporating the 
capacity constraint gives us the individual’s best response function: 
 
[4]  ˆ ()m i n [ () ,  ] .
s sm a x
ii iii xx xx x −− =  
 
Each subject received the same payoff table generated from [1] with parameters p = 116.875, c = 
17.875, d = 2.75 ei =900 and
max 8 i x = . Figure 1 graphs ˆ ()
s
ii x x−  and  ( )
s
ii x x−  using these 
parameters.  Let  /( 1) ij ji xx n − ≠ =− ∑  represent the average extraction choices of the other group 
members, where n = 5. The function  ii x x− =  defines the set of choices in which individual i’s 
extraction choice equals the average extraction of the others up to the group and individual 
capacity constraint (32,8). The intersection of  ii x x− =  and  ( )
s
ii x x−  at (24,6) is the standard 
symmetric Nash equilibrium. It is easy to show that if all individuals extract a single unit, then 
joint payoffs are maximized.     8
 
2.2 Other Regarding Preferences: Altruism, Reciprocity and Inequity Aversion 
Models of altruism, reciprocity and inequity aversion reflect a balance between self-regarding 
and other regarding preferences. In that case, individual i places a value on the payoffs of others. 
Suppose individual i’s utility is given by: 
 
[5] . iii j ji u π βπ
≠ =+∑  
 
Following Levine (1998) and Bowles (2003), i β  can be specified to capture both altruism and 
reciprocity motives as follows: 
 
[6] 
, if 
()
, if  ,
ii i i
ii ii
ii i i
x x
xx
x x
αρ
ββ
αρ
+
−
− −
−
 +≥
=− = 
−< 
 
 
where , ,  and  ii i α ρρ
+−  are positive constants. We construct  i β  in this way to guarantee that all 
best response functions are piecewise linear. The value  i α  is the altruism parameter; it is the 
marginal value that i places on the utility of the other players and is independent of their choices.  
In contrast, the reciprocity motive implies that the weight that the individual places on the 
payoffs of others is conditioned on their choices. An individual places a positive value,
+
i ρ , on 
the payoffs of others when she expects that their average extraction will not exceed her own, and 
a negative weight,  i ρ
− − , on their payoffs when she expect their average extraction to exceed her 
own.   
Upon substitution of [1] for each individual into [5] we have: 
 
 [7]  ()
() ()
(1 ) ( ) ( ) .
ii i i i i i i
ij i i i i i i ji
uep x c xx d x xx
ep x n c x x d x x x β
−−
−− − − ≠
=+ − + − +
++ − − + − + ∑
 
   9
Maximizing ui with respect to 
max
ii x x ≤  requires: 
 
[8]  2 [ ( 1) ] 0, if  0,  . ii
max
ii i i i i u x p c dx dx dx n c x x β −− ∂∂ = − − − − +− ≥ > =  
 
Note that 
22 20 , ii ux d ∂∂ = − <  which indicates that ui is strictly concave in xi; thus, [8] is 
necessary and sufficient to identify a best response to x-i.  The solution to [8] with a non-binding 
capacity constraint is: 
 
[9]  () ˆ () [ (1 ) ] / 2
ˆ () [ (1 ) ] / 2 ,
ii
i
ii i
s
ii i
x xp c d xd x n c d
xx d x n c d
β β
β
−−
−
−
−
=− − − + −
=−+ −
 
    
where  ˆ ()
s
ii x x−  is defined by [3]. Upon substitution of [6] we have: 
 
[10] 
ˆˆ () () ( ) [ ( 1 ) ] / 2 ,  f o r  
ˆ ()
ˆˆ ( ) ( ) ( )[ ( 1) ]/ 2 , for  .
i
i
s
iii i i i ii
ii s
iii i i i ii
x xx x d x n c dx x
xx
x xx x d x n c dx x
β
β
β
αρ
αρ
−
−
++
−− −
− −−
−− −
 =− + + − ≥
= 
=− − + − < 
 
 
Incorporating the capacity constraint yields the individual’s best response when she is motivated 
by a combination of altruism, reciprocity, and pure self-interest: 
 
[11]  ˆ ()m i n [() ,  ] .
max
ii ii i xx xx x
ββ
−− =  
 
2.2.1 Altruism  
We first consider an individual that balances altruism and self-interest when choosing her 
extraction, and does not engage in reciprocal behavior. Ignoring the capacity constraint for a 
moment, set  0 ii ρρ
+− ==  in [10] to obtain  ˆˆˆ () () ()
s
ii ii i i x xx xx x
βα
− −− ==  [( 1 ) ] / 2 i i dx n c d α − − +− .  
Incorporating the capacity constraint ( 8
max
i x = ) gives us the best response function for this 
individual, ˆ ()m i n [() ,  ] .
max
ii iii xx xx x
αα
−− =  Note that  ˆˆ ˆ (0) (0) ( 1) /2 (0)
ss
ii i i xx n c d x
α α =− − <   10
and  ˆˆ ˆ () () 2 () .
ss
ii i i i ii i i i x xxx xx d x xx
α α −− −− −− ∂∂ = ∂∂ − < ∂∂
3  These relationships reveal that when 
an individual balances altruism and pure self-interest, her unconstrained best response function 
lies below and is more steeply downward-sloping than her unconstrained best response function 
if she were purely self-regarding.  
In Figure 2 we have used  ˆ () ii x x
α
−  and the capacity constraint to graph a representative 
best response function,  ( ) ii x x
α
− , for an individual that balances an altruism and pure self-interest. 
We assume that the capacity constraint is binding in this case for relatively low levels of 
extraction by the other individuals, but this need not be the case if the altruism motive is strong 
enough. Except for the capacity constraint, the individual will always choose lower levels of 
extraction than if she was purely self-interested. Moreover, if she does not extract up to the 
capacity constraint, then her extraction will be declining in her expectation of what others will 
extract. Therefore, if altruism is a dominant motive, an econometric analysis of individual 
extraction choices should generate a best response function that is non-increasing and that has a 
strictly decreasing segment.  
 
2.2.2 Reciprocity 
Now consider an individual that is not motivated by altruism, but rather by a combination of 
reciprocity and self-interest. Again, ignoring the capacity constraint for the time being, substitute 
0 i α =  into [10] to obtain  
 
[12] 
ˆˆ () () [ ( 1 ) ] / 2 ,  f o r   ;
ˆ ()
ˆˆ () () [ ( 1 ) ] / 2 ,  f o r   .
i
i
s
iii ii ii
ii s
iii ii ii
x xx x d x n c dx x
xx
x xx x d x n c dx x
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
−
−
++
−− −
− −−
−− −
 =−+ − ≥
= 
=++ − < 
 
 
With the capacity constraint the individual’s best response is ˆ ()m i n [() ,  ] .
max
ii iii xx xx x
ρρ
−− =   
To derive the characteristics of  ( ) ii x x
ρ
−  we need to examine how  ˆ () ii x x
ρ+
− ,  ˆ () ii x x
ρ−
− , and 
ˆ ()
s
ii x x−  are related.  From [12] we have: 
 
                                                 
3 It is possible that the altruism motive is so strong that  ˆ (0) 0, i x
β =  but we ignore this possibility, because it implies 
that  ˆ (0) 0 for all  . ii x x
β
− =    11
[13.a]  ˆˆ ˆ (0) (0) ( 1) /2 (0);
ss
ii i i xx n c d x
ρ ρ
++ =−− <  
[13.b]  ˆˆ ˆ (0) (0) ( 1) /2 (0);
ss
ii i i xx n c d x
ρ ρ
−− =+− >  
[13.c]  ˆˆ ˆ () () () .
s
ii ii i iii i x xxx xxx xx
ρρ +−
−− −− −− ∂∂ < ∂ ∂ < ∂∂  
 
These relationships indicate that  ˆ () ii x x
ρ+
−  lies below and is more steeply sloping downward than 
ˆ ()
s
ii x x− , while  ˆ () ii x x
ρ−
−  lies above and has a greater slope than  ˆ ()
s
ii x x− .  In fact  ˆ () ii x x
ρ−
−  may 
have a positive slope if the negative reciprocity motive is strong enough. Figure 3 graphs 
ˆ ()
s
ii x x− , and possible  ˆ () ii x x
ρ+
−  and  ˆ () ii x x
ρ−
− .  The heavy dashed line is the individual’s best 
response function,  ( ) ii x x
ρ
− , when she is motivated by a combination of pure self interest and 
reciprocity. This function combines  ˆ () ii x x
ρ+
−  for  ii x x− ≥ ,  ˆ () ii x x
ρ−
−  for  , ii x x− <  and the capacity 
constraint.
4   
  Like the model of altruism, the best response function for a reciprocator may lie along the 
capacity constraint for relatively low levels of the expected extraction of others, but there must 
also be a strictly decreasing segment.  In this segment, the individual’s extraction exceeds her 
expectation of what others will extract. In a sense, she rewards the others for their restraint by 
extracting less than if she were purely self-interested. After this declining segment of the 
function her best response function is monotonically increasing along  ii x x− = , indicating that her 
extraction exactly equals the average of what she expects others to extract. For significantly 
higher levels of extraction by the others, the individual ‘punishes’ the others by extracting more 
than if she were purely self-interested. Although our graph indicates a declining segment of the 
best response function for very high extraction levels of the others, if the punishment motive is 
                                                 
4 To show that  () ii i x xx
ρ
−− =  in its third segment from the left, consider a pair  00 (, ) ii x x−  in this segment, where 
00 /( 1). ii xxn − =−  To show that 
0
i x  is a best response to 
0 , i x−  suppose instead that some  10
ii x x <  is a best response to 
0 . i x−  Note that  10 /( 1) ii xxn − <− .  However, using [12]  ˆ min[ ( ), ]
max
ii i xxx
ρ−
−  is the best response for all  /( 1) ii xxn − <− . 
Since at a point like  00 (, ) ii x x− ,  
01 ˆ min[ ( ), ] ,
max
ii i i i x xx xx
ρ−
− >> some  10
ii x x <  cannot be a best response to 
0 . i x−  Now 
suppose that some  20
ii x x >  is a best response to 
0 . i x−  Note that  20 /( 1) ii xxn − >− , but for all   /( 1) ii xxn − ≥− , 
ˆ min[ ( ), ]
max
ii i xxx
ρ+
− is the best response as long as  0 ˆ ()0
i i xx
ρ
−
+ ≥ . In Figure 3 note that at a point like  00 (, ) ii x x− , 
02 ˆ min[ ( ), ] ,
max
ii i i i x xx xx
ρ+
− <<  which indicates that  20
ii x x >  cannot be a best response to 
0 . i x−  Since higher or lower 
extraction levels than  00 /( 1) ii xxn − =−  cannot be a best response to 
0 , i x−  
0
i x  must be.   12
strong enough, then this will not occur and the best response function will continue along 
ii x x− =  up to the group and individual capacity constraint (32,8). 
If reciprocity is a dominant motive in our subject pool, then our estimation results should 
yield a non-monotonic regression that may lie along the capacity constraint for relatively low 
levels of expected extraction by others, but is strictly decreasing and lies above  ii x x− =  for 
somewhat higher levels of others’ extraction, and then follows  ii x x− =  for mid to higher levels 
of the expectation of others’ extraction.  The strictly increasing segment and the level of 
extraction for very high extraction levels of others are the characteristics that distinguish the 
reciprocity from altruism motives.  
 
2.2.3 Altruism and Reciprocity 
Deriving an individual’s best response function when she is motivated by a combination of 
altruism, reciprocity and self-interest is more involved, but nevertheless has a similar structure as 
the best response function in Figure 3.  In this case the best response function lies below  ( ) ii x x
ρ
− , 
due to the inclusion of the altruism parameter i α , except when it lies on the  ii x x− =  locus, and 
possibly at the capacity constraint for low expected levels of others’ extraction. This implies that, 
except when the capacity constraint binds, the best response function has a strictly declining 
segment at first and then a strictly increasing segment along  ii x x− = . How the function behaves 
for higher expected extraction of others depends on the relative importance of negative 
reciprocity and altruism.  
  
2.2.3 Inequity Aversion  
Our model of reciprocity and pure self-interest generates a best response function that is similar 
to that generated by the model of inequity aversion presented by Falk et al. (2002). They adapted 
Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) notion of inequity aversion to the common pool resource problem. 
An individual’s utility function is assumed to be 
 
[14]  max{ ,0} max{ ,0},
11
ii
ii ij ji
ji ji
u
nn
ρρ
ππ π π π
+−
≠≠
=− − − −
−− ∑∑  
   13
where as before  i ρ
+ and  i ρ
− are positive constants. In this model subjects are averse to 
differences in payoffs among individuals, with disadvantageous differences being more heavily 
weighted than advantageous differences ( i ρ
−> i ρ
+).   Falk et al. (2002) demonstrate that this 
model produces a best response function that has similar characteristics to our model of 
reciprocity.  
 
2.4 Conformism  
If individuals are motivated by conformism, then they prefer not to deviate much from others’ 
choices.  We model conformism as an internal penalty an individual faces when her choices 
deviate from the average expected choices of others.  This is very similar to the approach Luzzati 
(1999) used to adopt the conformism concept to explain voluntary contributions to public goods. 
It is also similar to Bowles’ (2003) concept of “guilt” that an individual experiences when he of 
she deviates from the choices of others.  A key difference between conformism and reciprocity is 
that when individuals are motivated by conformism, their actions are conditioned on the 
expected choices of others; they are not evaluating the payoffs of others. Suppose individual i’s 
utility is given by: 
 
[15] 
2 () / 2 . ii i i i ux x πγ − =− −  
 
Maximizing [15] without the capacity constraint,  ,
max
ii x x ≤  yields the individual’s unconstrained 
best response function: 
 
[16] 
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Incorporating the capacity constraint yields the individual’s best response when she has a 
preference for conformance,  ˆ ()m i n [() , ] .
max
ii ii i xx xx x
γγ
−− =    14
To compare an individuals’ best response when she balances conformism and simple self-
interest to her best response when she is motivated solely by self-interest, note from [3] 
that . ˆ 2( ) i
s
ii dx x p c dx− − =− −  Therefore, we can rewrite [16] as  
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From [17] we have 
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Thus,  ˆ () ii x x
γ
−  has a lower intercept than  ˆ ()
s
ii x x− , but a greater slope. In fact, if the conformism 
motive is strong enough,  ˆ () ii x x
γ
−  may be upward sloping.
5  In general, the conformism motive 
can produce several best response functions with different characteristics. However, all such best 
response functions are monotonic except when the capacity constraint is binding. This 
distinguishes the conformism motive from reciprocity, mixed altruism and reciprocity, and 
inequity aversion.  
 
4. Experiment Design  
Our experimental design is similar to that of Cardenas, Stranlund and Willis (2000). Subjects 
were placed into groups of five and participated in a ten-period common pool resource game.
6 
Subjects sat facing away from each other and were not allowed to communicate.  Payoffs were 
calculated using [1] with parameters p = 116.875, c = 17.875, d = 2.75 and ei = 900 presented as 
a table (see the appendix for the experiment instructions, including the payoff table).
7  In each 
                                                 
5 This requires  /( 1) . i nd γ −> 
6Assignment to groups was not completely random.  We tried to ensure that relatives were in separate groups. 
7 For the experiments in the field, the participants were asked to choose a level of extraction between 1 and 9 units, 
instead of between 0 and 8 units. The reason of doing this is that the concept of zero extraction is very difficult to   15
round, subjects were asked both their extraction choice and their expectation about the extraction 
choice of the other group members.
8  After all subjects had made their decisions, the monitor 
collected this information and announced the aggregate level of extraction. With this 
information, individuals were able to calculate both the actual level of total extraction by the 
others and their own payoffs given the others’ decisions.  
The experiments were conducted in three regions of Colombia (Magdalena Region, 
Pacific Coast and Caribbean Coast) in communities in which the primary activity is artisanal 
fishing.  Table 1 presents some summary statistics of the subject pool.  Over three-quarters of the 
subjects were male fishermen. Subjects also had relatively low levels of education (mean 5.5 
years) with an average age approaching 39.  
   A total of 420 individuals (140 per region) participated in these experiments with average 
earnings of 15,340 pesos per person (about US$6) during the summer of 2004. Daily wages in 
these regions averaged 10,000-15,000 pesos. Earnings were paid in cash at the end of each 
experiment. Each experiment lasted about three hours.  Before each experiment began, 
instructions were read aloud by the monitor and several practice rounds that did not count toward 
final earnings were played to familiarize the participants with the experiments.  
These field experiments were conducted with subjects who face the same kind of social 
dilemma about the exploitation of local natural resources in their everyday lives as the dilemma 
modeled in the experiments. Therefore, it is likely that participants’ prior experiences with 
common pool resources may influence their preferences and choices in a way that is not 
controlled by the experiment (Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004).  Moreover, many subjects knew each 
other from daily interactions. Thus, it is possible that their decisions were affected by these 
relationships. 
 
5. Experimental Results and Analysis 
Table 2 presents some summary statistics of individual extraction and the expected and actual 
extraction of others. The mean individual level of extraction was 4.6 units, but the purely self-
interested Nash equilibrium prediction is that each individual would extract six units. We also 
                                                                                                                                                             
explain in the field since the participants depend so critically on the extraction of local natural resources. The payoff 
table they were given was modified to account for this. 
8 Croson (1998) also asked subjects about their expectations about the choices of the other group members and 
compensated them based on the accuracy of their prediction. In our experiments, earnings were based solely on the 
individual’s extraction choice and were not affected by her prediction of others’ choices.    16
calculated individual differences between their actual choice and their purely self-interested best 
response given their reported expectations of what others would do. Not surprisingly, on average, 
subjects did not pursue self-interested Nash strategies as suggested by a two-unit average 
deviation from their purely self-interested Nash best responses. 
Individuals’ expected levels of extraction by others in their group were significantly 
different from others’ actual extraction. In fact, as shown in Table 2, individuals tended to be too 
optimistic about others’ extraction
9. On average, individuals expected that the other four 
members of the group would extract 15.4 units, 2.9 less units their actual extraction. This 
difference was greater in the last period, when individual’s expectation of the others’ extraction 
was 3.8 units lower than their actual extraction.  
            Identifying the existence of individual deviations from purely self-interested Nash best 
responses functions is the first step towards understanding the motivations driving individual 
behavior. Random effects Tobit models were used to estimate summaries of individual best 
response functions and test the theoretical models explained in section 3.  The use of random 
effects models responds to the nature of our experimental data in which repeated observations 
are obtained from each individual. Also, the Tobit models account for the censored nature of our 
data since individual decisions were constrained to be between 0 and 8 units. Moreover, since 
our theoretical development yielded piece-wise linear best response functions, we estimated 
spline functions which allow the slope of the regression to vary in different intervals of the 
expected extraction of others but imposes continuity on the estimated regression.  
  Our regression results are reported in Table 3. Model 1 is a spline regression that divides 
the range of individuals’ expectation of the extraction levels of the other group members, 
denoted
e
i x− , into four-unit intervals. Recall that for our models of pure self-interest alone and for 
self-interest combined with altruism, reciprocity or inequity aversion individual best response 
functions could exhibit a flat segment at the capacity constraint of eight units for relatively low 
levels of expected extraction of others, but that each must have a monotonically decreasing 
segment. In contrast, we estimate a summary best response function that is flat and significantly 
below the capacity constraint (the estimate of the constant is 2.46) for  8
e
i x− < , and then is 
monotonically increasing as the expected extraction of others increases. Thus, we reject the 
                                                 
9 Croson (1998) also reports that 33% of her subject pool exhibited over optimism when predicting other’s behavior.    17
hypothesis that pure self-interest, altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion or combinations of 
these motives can explain average behavior in our experiments.   
  Instead it appears that the model of conformism best describes average strategies in our 
experiments. Our model of linear conformism generates a Nash best response function that is 
monotonic except possibly at the capacity constraint. Moreover, if the conformism motive is 
strong enough the function is monotonically increasing. Except for the flat segment for low 
levels of expected extraction by others, which we will revisit shortly, this is exactly what our 
empirical results indicate. This result is consistent with the notion of conditional cooperation as 
an explanatory feature of individual behavior. However, we move forward from that concept by 
identifying that conformism, instead of reciprocity, is the most important motive driving 
conditional behavior in our subject pool.   
As discussed by Carpenter (2004), the conformism motive could generate less 
conservative outcomes than predicted by the model of pure self-interests. That is, subjects could 
conform to similarly high levels of extraction.  Recall that in our case, mean levels of individual 
extraction were well below the conventional Nash prediction (see Table 2). Thus, in our subject 
pool, it appears that the conformism motive leads to a more conservative (though not efficient) 
exploitation of the commons.
  
The spline function estimated in Model 1 was useful to test for any changes in the slope 
of the regression. However, the coefficients obtained for each interval suggest that the expected 
extraction of others could be partitioned into fewer intervals. The first two intervals of Model 1 
show positive coefficients that are not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the rest of 
the intervals have coefficients that are statistically greater than zero, but they are not significantly 
different from each other. The null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are equal to each 
other cannot be rejected (Wald test, p = 0.59). This leads us to Model 2 which includes just two 
intervals, 0 8
e
i x− ≤<  and  32 8 ≤ ≤ −
e
i x . The results show statistically positive slope coefficient in 
both intervals, indicating that the function is monotonically increasing. However, the slope 
coefficients are statistically different (p = 0.03) which may suggest a nonlinearity that our 
theoretical model of conformism does not explain.  
   We also investigated whether our fundamental results varied by region. In each model, 
we included dummy variables to capture regional effects, none of which are statistically 
significant.  Note that in Model 3, we estimated a simple linear relationship between individual   18
extraction and their expectations of the extraction of others in their group; that is, we did not 
partition the expected extraction of others into intervals. This allows us to interact the regional 
dummy variables with the expected extraction of others, but these interactions are also not 
significant.   
In each model we also included the period as an explanatory variable to capture the effect 
of time on individual choices. In all cases, individual extraction is increasing as the experiment 
proceeds. This is consistent with results that others have found in games of social dilemmas; 
namely, high levels of cooperation in the first rounds of these experiments, but declining 
cooperation rates over time (Fehr et al., 2002) 
   Finally, we also examined the effects of individual characteristics such as age, gender and 
years of education.
10 As is evident in Table 3, age and gender are not significant in explaining 
individual choices. The coefficient for education is positive and highly significant in each of our 
models.  It is possible that the more educated individuals may be better able to identify the purely 
self-interested Nash strategy and use this to their advantage.  This result could suggest that those 
with lower levels of education who are unsure about what to choose might use the decisions of 
others as a source of information to guide their decisions (Smith and Bell 1994). Moreover, they 
may simply try to ensure that their choices roughly conform to what the rest of the group is 
doing.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
We have developed and tested several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract 
from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a mix of self-interest and altruism, 
reciprocity, inequity aversion, or conformism. Using data generated from common pool 
experiments conducted in three regions of Colombia, we estimated individual extraction choices 
as a function of their expectation about the choices of the others in their experiment.  An 
econometric summary of individual strategies strongly suggests that self-interest, altruism, 
reciprocity and inequity aversion are not the primary motivations in our subject pool. Rather, our 
results suggest that the conformism motive best explains average strategies in our experiments. 
                                                 
10 420 individuals participated in our experiment. However, by including age, gender and education as explanatory 
variables we lost the observations of 15 individuals from whom we did not have this information. 
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Moreover, it appears that conformism works to generate outcomes that are more efficient than 
that predicted by a model of pure self-interest.   
  Of course, we do not claim that our results suggest that all the subjects were primarily 
conformists; only that conformism best explains average strategies. It is quite probable that there 
are individuals in our subject pool who are better described as self-interested, altruists, or 
reciprocators.  Therefore, the next step in this research project is to characterize individual 
strategies rather than average strategies. This will allow us to investigate how the composition of 
individual motivations produces outcomes. This would be similar to the work of others in the 
context of public goods games (e.g. Fischbacher, Gachter and Fehr 2001, and Kurzban and 
Houser 2005). Notably, this kind of analysis has been not conducted for common pool games, 
much less in the field with direct users of common pool resources.  
Furthermore, it may be fruitful to formulate dynamic strategies under alternative 
motivations and analyze our data in light of these strategies. 
It is clear that alternative individual motivations will have profound impacts on the 
design of policies to manage common pool resources. Because of this future research should also 
consider the effects of different institutions on outcomes in the presence of alternative motives.  
Indeed, institutions may affect preferences as suggested by several authors including Cardenas, 
Stranlund and Willis (2000) and Frey and Jegen (2001). Thus, examining the interactions 
between preferences and institutions appears to be a fruitful area for new research.    
          Finally,  although  we  found  that  our  main  conclusion  about  the  importance  of  the 
conformism motive did not vary across the three regions we visited, one should stop short of 
concluding that this result is likely to be robust to differences in contexts. Additional research in 
this area is needed to generate comparable results across subjects in different environments. 
Ultimately, a sufficient number of similar studies would allow us to draw conclusions about what 
motivates common pool resource users across the developing world. 
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  Figure 1: An Individual’s Self-Interested Nash Strategy 
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Figure 2: Balancing Altruism and Pure Self Interest.  
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Figure 3: Balancing Reciprocity and Self-Interest.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics of subject characteristics 
 
Region Mean  Age  Mean number of years 
of formal education 
Number of 
Males 
Number of 
Females 
Magdalena 41.3  4.8  119  21 
Pacific 39.9  5.4  123  17 
Caribbean 34.6  6.4  65  75 
All Regions  38.6  5.5  307  113 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of individual extraction and the extraction of others 
Variable  All rounds  Last round 
Mean Level of extraction  4.6  4.8 
Mean Deviation From Self-
Interested Best response  2.5 2.3 
Mean Expected Level of 
Extraction of Others  15.37 15.38 
Mean Actual Level of 
Extraction of Others  18.32 19.14 
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Table 3: Random effects Tobit models of individual best responses  
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3 
Constant  2.46 
(0.45)*** 
2.48 
(0.43)*** 
2.32 
(0.43)*** 
04
e
i x− ≤<   0.07 
(0.62)     
48
e
i x− ≤<   0.04 
(0.05)     
81 2
e
i x− ≤<   0.17 
(0.04)***     
12 16
e
i x− ≤<   0.09 
(0.04)**     
16 20
e
i x− ≤<  0.12 
(0.04)***     
20 24
e
i x− ≤<  0.10 
(0.50)**     
24 28
e
i x− ≤<  0.17 
(0.06)***     
28 32
e
i x− ≤<   0.16 
(0.07)**     
08
e
i x− ≤<     0.06 
(0.02)***   
83 2
e
i x− <≤    0.13 
(0.007)***   
e
i x−       0.11 
(0.01)*** 
Period  0.03 
(0.01)*** 
0.03 
(0.01)*** 
0.04 
(0.01)*** 
Regional Effects       
Pacific  -0.06 
(0.21) 
-0.05 
(0.21) 
-0.38 
(0.30) 
Magdalena  0.08 
(0.21) 
0.08 
(0.21) 
-0.06 
(0.29) 
Pacific
e
i x− ×       0.02 
(0.01) 
Magdalena
e
i x− ×       0.01 
(0.01) 
Individual Characteristics       
Age  0.00 
(0.006) 
-0.00 
(0.006) 
-0.00 
(0.006) 
Gender =1 if female  0.04 
(0.20) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.06 
(0.20) 
Education (years)  0.10 
(0.03)*** 
0.10 
(0.03)*** 
0.10 
(0.03)*** 
Wald χ2  447.96***  444.74***  441.92*** 
 
The dependent variable is the individual’s level of extraction, xi. Standard errors are shown in 
parenthesis. * reflect p-values:  * p ≤   0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01. 
Number of observations = 4050. Number of subjects = 405. 
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Appendix: Instructions 
11 
 
Introduction 
The exercise in which you are going to participate can be different from other exercises in which 
members of your community might have participated in the past; therefore, any comments that 
you might have heard about the exercise does not necessarily apply to the version in which you 
will participate. 
 
This exercise is similar to a situation in which a group of people has to make decisions on how to 
use a community owned natural resource. For example, a forest, a drinking water source, or a 
fishing area.  
 
You have been selected to participate in a group of 5 people. Today, there are 3 groups 
participating at the same time. However, each group is independent and the decisions of the other 
groups do not affect the decisions of your group. Each group will be differentiated by the color 
of the sheets used during the exercise.  
 
In this exercise you will earn money depending on your decisions and the decisions of the other 
members of your group. The reason why we use money in this exercise is to represent real life 
situations in which your economic decisions will bring yourself monetary consequences. You 
will play several rounds equivalent, for example, to periods such as years, months, or fishing 
seasons. 
 
In each round, you will earn a number of points that will be equivalent to a number of pesos. At 
the end of the exercise, we will sum the total number of pesos earned in all the rounds, we will 
round the total earned, and we will personally hand that to you in cash. 
 
We will now explain how to participate in the exercise. Please pay a lot of attention to the 
instructions. If you understand the instructions, you will be able to make better decisions in the 
exercise. Please, remain seated and do not speak with other participants. If you have a question, 
raise you hand. The assistant will answer your question in private. 
 
 
Earnings Table 
We will now hand out the EARNINGS TABLE which contains all the information you will need 
to make your decisions in this exercise.  
 
All participants have the same EARNINGS TABLE that you do. The numbers in the table are 
points equivalent to the pesos you can earn in each round, depending on both what you decide to 
extract and the decisions made by others in your group.  
 
In each round you have to decide how many units of the resource you will extract. We will call 
your decision “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION.” These units correspond to the columns 1 to 9 
in the EARNING TABLE. In this exercise, each participant can extract a maximum of 9 units, 
and a minimum of one. 
                                                 
11 Juan Camilo Osorio translated the instructions from Spanish to English.   28
In the EARNINGS TABLE, the decisions of the other members of your group correspond to the 
column “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”, which will be a number between 4 and 36. 
This number is the sum of the units extracted by the other members of the group. When you 
make your decision, you will not know the decisions made by the other members of your group.  
 
Once all participants hand in their decisions, we will sum all the levels of extraction and will 
announce the group’s TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION. With this information you will be 
able to calculate the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS,” which is equal to the “TOTAL 
LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” minus “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”. 
 
Let’s see some examples so that you can understand how to use the EARNINGS TABLE. 
 
Imagine you decide that “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” is 4 units, and that the other 
members of the group extract 4 units each.  We will announce that the TOTAL level of 
extraction is 20 units. Since you decided to extract 4, you can calculate the “LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION OF OTHERS,” which is equal to the “TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” 
minus your level of extraction. In this case, the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS” is 
20 – 4 = 16 units. Thus, as seen in the table, your earnings will be 859.  
 
In the previous example all the members of the group picked the same level of extraction. 
However, each person can pick a different number. For example, if you choose 4 and the other 
members of the group extract 2, 3, 7 and 8, we will announce that the TOTAL level of extraction 
is 24. Given the fact that you decided to extract 4, the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF 
OTHERS” will be 20. In other words, the total level of extraction (24) minus your level of 
extraction (4). In this case, as seen on the table, your earnings will be 754. 
 
The EARNINGS TABLE has an additional table called “Average of the others”. This column 
indicates you the average decision of your group for a determined level. For example, if the 
others extract 8, this means that the average amount extracted per person is 2. Instead, if the 
others extract 20, the average amount extracted per person is 5.  
 
Take a few seconds to look at the EARNINGS TABLE and understand how it works. If you have 
any questions, please raise your hand and someone will come to you.  
 
 
Decision Card 
I will now explain how you will inform us in each round your level of extraction. In each round 
you will receive a “decision card”. The decision cards are these small pieces of paper. 
 
In each round you will have to write: 
- The number of the round, which will be announced by us. 
-“MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”, in other words, how many units will you extract, which in 
this case will be a number between 1 and 9.  
-You also have to write what you think the other members of your group will extract. 
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This is the sum of the levels of extraction that you think the other 4 members of your group will 
extract. This sum is a number between 4 and 36. Remember that when you make your decision 
you do not know what the others are choosing. However, we want to know how much you think 
the others will extract. For example, if you think that two people will choose 3 and the other two 
5, then, what you think the others will extract is 16 (3 +3+ 5 + 5).  
 
What you write on the level of extraction of others will not affect your earnings, either if it is 
equal or different to what actually happened. However, we are interested to know what you are 
thinking about the level of extraction of the others when you make your choice. 
 
After all the members of your group have made their decisions, we will pick up the 5 
participants’ cards and calculate the groups’ TOTAL level of extraction. Once we announce the 
total extraction of the group you will be able to calculate the true “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION 
OF OTHERS.” With this information and your level of extraction, you will be able to calculate 
how much you earned by looking at the EARNINGS TABLE.  
 
It is very important that you remember that your decisions are private and that you can not show 
them to the other members of the group. We will only announce the TOTAL level of extraction.  
 
Calculations sheet 
Each one of you will receive a calculations sheet with which you record your decisions and 
earnings. Please write your participant number in the calculations sheet. This is the same number 
that is written in the decision cards.  
 
Let’s see how to use the calculations sheet by looking at an example. Suppose you decided to 
extract 4 units. In consequence, you have to write 4 under column A of the calculations sheet, as 
shown in the example. You should also write this number in “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” 
in the Decision Card .You are writing your decision in two places, in the Decision Card, which 
you will hand in back to us, and in the calculations sheet. Please, check that you have written the 
same number in the two sheets before you hand in the decision card.  
 
After all the members of the group have finished taking their decisions, we will pick up the cards 
of the 5 participants and calculate the groups’ TOTAL level of extraction.  
 
Suppose the “TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” is 20 units. You should write 20 in the 
column B in the calculations sheet. In order to calculate accurately the “LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION OF OTHERS,” you should subtract Column A (“MY LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION”) from Column B (“TOTAL LEVEL OF EXTRACTION”). You should write 
the result in Column C (“LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”). In our example, the 
“LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS” is 16 (20 – 4.) 
 
In order to calculate your earnings, you should use the EARNINGS TABLE. In this case, given 
that “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” is 4 and the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS” 
is 16, then your earnings will be 859. This is the information you should write in column D.   
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Practice rounds 
Before we begin the exercise we will do some practice rounds. The decisions that you take in 
these practice rounds would not affect your earnings today. 
 
The first practice round will be done altogether. First, write the number of the round in the 
decision card, in this case (P) of practice. After that, looking at the EARNINGS TABLE suppose 
that each one of you picked 5. Write this in the decision card and in Column A of the earnings 
sheet. You should also write in the decision card what you think the other members of your 
group will extract. In this case, it is 20, because we know that all of them picked 5. Remember, 
when we begin the real exercise, you will not know the exact number of extraction of the other 
members while you will be picking your level of extraction. In the next rounds you will write 
what you think the others will extract.  
 
Given that all the members of the group picked 5 in this example, the total level of extraction for 
the group is 25. Each one should write now 25 under Column B (“TOTAL LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION”) in the calculations sheet. 
 
Now subtract “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” (5) from the “TOTAL LEVEL OF 
EXTRACTION” (25). In other words, column B minus Column A. This operation is equal to 20. 
This number is the true “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”, which you should write in 
Column C. Using the number in Column A, “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION,” and the number 
under column C, the “LEVEL OF EXTRACTION OF OTHERS”, you should use the earnings 
table to determine your earnings for this round. In this case, your earnings will be 790. Write 
your earnings in column D. 
 
We did this example and the previous one supposing that everyone picked the same level of 
extraction. However, when you make your decision, you may choose the level of extraction that 
you want by looking at the EARNINGS TABLE. Are there any questions? 
 
Let’s continue with the next practice round. First, write down the round’s name in the decision 
card, in this case (P) of practice. Now, each one of you has to decide your level of extraction 
using the EARNINGS TABLE. Write it down in the decision card and in Column A in the 
calculations sheet. Before you hand in the decision card, check that the number in column A is 
equal to the one you wrote in “MY LEVEL OF EXTRACTION” in the decision card. You 
should also write in the decision card the level of extraction that you believe the other members 
of the group will extract.  
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EARNINGS TABLE 
My level of extraction  Level of 
extraction 
of others  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
4  900 996  1087  1172  1252  1326  1395  1458  1516 
5  882 976  1064  1146  1223  1295  1361  1421  1476 
6  864 955  1040  1120  1194  1263  1326  1384  1436 
7  846 934  1017  1094  1165  1231  1292  1347  1396 
8  829 914  994 1068  1137  1200  1258  1310  1357 
9  811 893  970 1042  1108  1168  1223  1273  1317 
10  793 873  947 1016  1079  1137  1189  1236  1277 
11  775 852  923  989  1050  1105  1154  1198  1237 
12  757 831  900  963  1021  1073  1120  1161  1197 
13  739 811  877  937  992 1042  1086  1124  1157 
14  721 790  853  911  963 1010  1051  1087  1117 
15  703 769  830  885  934 978  1017  1050  1077 
16  686 749  807  859  906 947 983  1013  1038 
17  668 728  783  833  877 915 948  976  998 
18  650 708  760  807  848 884 914  939  958 
19  632 687  736  780  819 852 879  901  918 
20  614 666  713  754  790 820 845  864  878 
21  596 646  690  728  761 789 811  827  838 
22  578 625  666  702  732 757 776  790  798 
23  560 604  643  676  703 725 742  753  758 
24  543 584  620  650  675 694 708  716  719 
25  525 563  596  624  646 662 673  679  679 
26  507 543  573  598  617 631 639  642  639 
27  489 522  549  571  588 599 604  604  599 
28  471 501  526  545  559 567 570  567  559 
29  453 481  503  519  530 536 536  530  519 
30  435 460  479  493  501 504 501  493  479 
31  417 439  456  467  472 472 467  456  439 
32  400 419  433  441  444 441 433  419  400 
33  382 398  409  415  415 409 398  382  360 
34  364 378  386  389  386 378 364  345  320 
35  346 357  362  362  357 346 329  307  280 
36  328 336  339  336  328 314 295  270  240 
 
 
 
 
 